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The role of nuclear power as a cost-efficient mitigation option to achieving climate policy targets has long been controversially discussed. The Fukushima accident in March 2011 has led many (but not all) countries to reconsider the future role of nuclear. Lack of social acceptance, but also geo-political and economic factors render the future role of nuclear energy in power generation and as an option to achieve climate policy targets highly uncertain. Our paper looks at the economic effects of a potential global phase-out of nuclear energy on the costs of meeting ambitious climate policy targets in 2020. The targets for developed countries are derived from a proposal by the European Commission, while targets for emerging and developing countries are taken from the pledges they made at recent United Nations climate conferences.
Our calculations with a well-known global energy systems model show that the impact of a global phase-out of nuclear energy on global mitigation costs is quite modest, but there are substantial differences across countries. Total compliance costs increase the most for Japan and the USA, but they are rather marginal, if measured in terms of GDP. China, India and Russia benefit from a nuclear phase out because their additional revenues from selling certificates outweigh the additional costs of losing nuclear power as a mitigation option. Our findings also highlight the importance of certificate trading to achieving climate targets in a cost-efficient way. If Japan or the US were banned from certificate trading with other countries, because they do not participate in a second Kyoto period, their compliance costs increased substantially under a phase-out of nuclear. The EU, however, would benefit, because certificate prices were be lower.
Introduction
For many countries, nuclear power has long been considered a key ingredient to meeting electricity demand and achieving greenhouse gas (GHG) emission targets. According to Joskow and Parsons (2012) the main nuclear electricity producing countries, i.e. the USA, Japan and France, had already extended or were planning to extend the licenses and operating lives of most existing power plants prior to the Fukushima accident. New power plants were under construction in Finland and France, and planned in Japan, the UK, the USA, Russia, India, South Korea, Taiwan, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey. China, in particular, had announced to increase its share of nuclear power generation by 2020 from 1% to 6%.
Analyses by the International Energy Agency, for example, had indicated a remarkable increase in the share of nuclear energy (IEA 2010a). Accordingly, 20 to 30 new nuclear power plants were envisaged every year for the next four decades, in particular in Asia and in Eastern Europe. In the BLUE Map scenario (IEA 2010a), which was designed to meet global climate targets, the share of nuclear in electricity generation rises from around 14% (< 400 GW) in 2007 to 24% (i.e. 1 250 GW) in 2020 -despite problems related to skills shortage, the storage of nuclear waste, concerns about more nuclear accidents, security issues (e.g. terrorist attacks) and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other seminal analyses by the IEA (2010b), the US Energy Information Administration (EIA 2009), and the Energy Modelling Forum (Clarke et al. 2009 ) also featured increased deployment rates for nuclear power generation over the next decades.
Since the Fukushima Daiichi accident in March 2011, support for nuclear, has declined in many countries. Results from WIN-Gallup International public opinion polls suggest, that the Fukushima accident has resulted in a global shift in opinion -at least initially (WIN-Gallup 2011).
As an immediate reaction, several countries, including India, Pakistan, Russia, Spain, the USA and the EU, announced stress tests for existing nuclear power plants. Italy renounced a planned return to nuclear power via referendum, and China declared a memorandum for permits for new power plants. Arguably, the strongest initial reaction could be observed in Germany, Belgium and Switzerland, where governments decided to phase-out nuclear by 2022, 2025 and 2034, respectively (see also Skea et al. 2013 Schneider et al. 2011) . Recent developments also suggest that the impact of the Fukushima accident on the future of nuclear energy may be less severe than initially thought (e.g. China). Similarly, although nuclear energy contributes substantially less to global power generation than before Fukushima in the latest studies by the IEA (2012a,b), it continues to be a major power generation technology.
In addition to the lack of social and political acceptance in some regions, nuclear energy faces severe economic challenges resulting from high capital costs (to meet, among others, more stringent safety standards) and competition from other fuels, such as unconventional gas in the USA (e.g. Davis 2011 ). Hence, the future role of nuclear energy in power generation and, consequently, as an option to achieve climate policy targets, is highly uncertain.
To limit the increase in global surface temperature to 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels carbon dioxide emissions must be reduced by 50-85% in 2050 compared to 2000 and global emissions must peak before 2020 (Gupta et al. 2007 ). For 2020, Gupta et al. (2007) The aim of this study is to assess the impact of a potential global nuclear phase-out on the costs of meeting international climate policy targets for 2020. Methodologically, the analyses rely on simulations with a global partial equilibrium model, which allows for a wide range of electricity generation technologies and for a differentiated assessment of impacts for numerous countries. The simulations take into account that a phase-out of nuclear power may alter countries' baseline emissions and may restrict their options to mitigate GHG emissions. The simulations allow for trading of emission certificates across countries to assess the impact of the phase-out of nuclear power on certificate prices, countries' revenues from certificate trading, and on domestic mitigation efforts. Further, the analyses cover the outcomes of a nuclear phase-out when trading of certificates is limited to countries that have committed to a second Kyoto period.
Literature review
Studies of the environmental implications of Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreement unequivocally conclude that the targets implied are unlikely to be consistent with a path towards reaching the 2°C target (e.g. 2009; Den Elzen et al. 2010a , 2010b Rogelj et al., 2010; Höhne et al. 2012 Only a few studies focus on the role of nuclear power in global emission mitigation scenarios such as Kurosawa (2000) , Vaillancourt et al. (2008) , Rafaj and Kypreos (2008) , Remme and Blesl (2008) and Bauer et al. (2012) . Assuming rather modest targets in Annex I countries for 2030 of 92% and 108% of 1990 emission levels, Kurosawa (2000) finds that the cost of a global phaseout of nuclear energy amounts to 0.36% lower consumption. Vaillancourt et al. (2008) find nuclear power to be the dominant power technology, having a share in the power mix of more than 50% in 2100 under various emission reduction scenarios. Rafaj and Kypros (2008) conclude that as a result of a nuclear phase-out, global CO2e emissions in 2050 are 15% higher (a reduction below 2000 levels of 42% instead of 49%). According to Remme and Blesl (2008) , annual costs of reaching the 2°C targets may be lowered by 9%, if nuclear energy was allowed to increase by two thirds compared to the base case and account for a share of 35% of global electricity generation compared to 21% in the base case. Only the study by Bauer et al. (2012) is motivated by the Fukushima accident and it also highlights the interdependence of climate and nuclear power policies. Bauer et al. (2012) analyse the impact of decommissioning existing nuclear power plants and restricting future investments in new nuclear power capacity under long-term emissions caps, which are consistent with the 2°C target. The near-term effect of a nuclear phase-out on GDP is rather small (loss of less than 0.1% in 2020), and somewhat larger in the long-term (loss of 0.2% in 2050). Bauer et al. (2012) also point out that the economic impact of introducing an ambitious climate policy is much larger than the impact of restricting the use of nuclear power. For 2020, such a climate policy leads to a loss in global GDP of around 1.2%.
In sum, with the exception of the analysis by Bauer et al. (2012) , which links a long-term, topdown growth model with a bottom-up model, existing studies rely on bottom-up type models to explore the role of nuclear in meeting climate policy targets. Most (but not all) of studies find the additional costs of a nuclear phase-out to be low, and to amount to less than 1% of global GDP. Further, existing studies exhibit only a weak link to actual climate policy and do not allow for certificate trading. Finally, since most modelling analyses tend to be rather aggregate at the country and regional level, they often do not allow for a country-specific representation of technologies or policy impacts.
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For the baseline and policy simulations we employ POLES, which is a world simulation model for the energy sector. POLES is a techno-economic model with endogenous projection of energy prices, a complete accounting of demand and supply of energy carriers and associated technologies. The model includes, among others, 30 different power generation technologies for 57 different countries/regions, and accounts for CO2 and other GHG emissions. This high level of regional disaggregation allows to a very large extent for a country-specific modelling of technology availability.
POLES has been employed to generate a reference baseline and a nuclear phase-out baseline.
Both baselines rely on the same macroeconomic assumptions: world population is expected to reach 9 billion (i.e. 9000 million) in 2050 (UN, 2009) and global GDP growth is expected to evolve at an average rate of 4% between 2010 and 2020 (and to be more moderate on the long term with a stabilization of around 2% by 2050). The WEO reference baseline has been calibrated on the energy balances of the 'Current Policies' scenario in the World Energy Outlook 2010 (IEA 2010b). This reference case represents a world in which no additional climate policies are implemented. 1 Global power generation is assumed to grow by 2% and nuclear energy by 1.6% per year between 2010 and 2050 to meet a rising energy demand, in particular in developing countries (see Figure 1 ).
Between 2010 and 2020 global electricity generation in the WEO reference baseline is assumed to increase by 34% (from 20 700 TWh to 27 700 TWh). Fossil fuels remain the dominant source of power generation in 2010 and 2020 (share of 65%), with a key role played by coal (about 40%). Between 2010 and 2020, global coal-based power generation increases by more than 40%. This above-average growth is mostly driven by the demand in emerging economies. The second-most important fuel in 2010 is natural gas (21%), which grows by 32% until 2020, and keeps its share in the global power mix about constant. The share of renewables in global electricity generation rises from 20% in 2010 to 22% in 2020, which corresponds to an increase in generation by 45% over this ten year span. Finally, the share of nuclear power decreases from 13.5% in 2010 to 12% in 2020, while absolute generation increases by 20%, and installed nuclear capacity by 23%. This growth in nuclear energy is mainly driven by emerging economies and, in particular, in China, with a strong increase from 14 GW to 58 GW installed capacity. India almost doubles its installed capacity between 2010 and 2020 (from 6 GW to 11 GW).
Moreover, nuclear power generation is concentrated in only a few countries: the USA, China, France and Japan account for more than 60% of global nuclear power production. South Korea, Russia and Canada produce another combined 15%. The share of nuclear power in the national power mix differs substantially and ranges from 72% in France to 36% in South Korea, 31% in Japan, 18% in the USA, 15% in Russia and Canada, and 7% in China. In contrast to most other countries, nuclear power production in Germany will decrease between 2010 and 2020 even in the WEO reference baseline, since Germany had decided to phase-out nuclear prior to the Fukushima accident (but at a somewhat slower rate). This also translates into a small decrease in nuclear power generation for the EU in the WEO reference baseline. In India, nuclear power accounts for a rather small share in the power mix, i.e.3.5% in 2010 and 4.2% in 2020. As a consequence, our country-specific analyses often disregard India (see also Table A1 ). Power generation by fuel and country in 2010 and 2020 in both baseline scenarios
In the nuclear phase-out baseline no new nuclear capacities will be built, and existing nuclear capacities are progressively decommissioned over the next four decades. The speed of the phase-out is determined on a country-by-country level, based on the average age of the nuclear power plants. Although by 2050 not all nuclear power plants are phased-out, the production of electricity from nuclear power plants is reduced by that time to about 1% (i.e. 500 TWh) of global power generation, compared to 11% in the WEO reference baseline. In the medium term, nuclear power accounts for about 12% (3°350 TWh) of global power generation in the WEO reference baseline by 2020, but only 8% (2 100 TWh) in the nuclear phase-out baseline by 2020.
The decrease in nuclear power generation in 2020 by 1°250 TWh in the nuclear phase-out baseline corresponds to about 5% of global power generation and is mostly compensated by a stronger deployment of fossil fuels (see Figure 2and Table A1 ). The shares of coal and natural gas in global power generation increase from 42% to 45% for coal and from 21% to 22% for natural gas. In comparison, the share of renewables increases from 22% to 23%. The higher generation costs of the power mix lead to higher electricity prices and a decrease in global power production by 60 TWh (0.2%).
In the nuclear phase-out baseline, global GHG emissions in 2020 are about 2.2%, i.e. 800 million metric tons (Mt) CO2e, higher compared to WEO reference baseline (see also Table A2 ). For most countries, the nuclear phase-out leaves baseline GHG emissions almost unchanged, because nuclear energy is not an important part of their national power mix. As expected, countries with a high dependency on nuclear power generation in the WEO reference baseline tend to experience a significant increase in GHG emissions, in particular Japan, Canada and Russia (see Figure 3 ). In Japan, the nuclear phase-out increases GHG emissions by 7% (80 Mt CO2e) in 2020, even though two-thirds of power generated from nuclear plants is replaced by natural gas (and not by coal). Due to a lower share of nuclear energy in their national power mix, GHG emissions rise less in China (3%) and the USA (2%), although nuclear power production is mainly replaced by coal. In absolute terms, however, the increase in emissions is largest in China (+ 300 Mt CO2e) and the USA (+100 Mt CO2e 
Policy scenarios
Our policy scenarios include GHG emission targets for Annex I and non-Annex I countries for 2020 that are deemed consistent with meeting the 2°C target. For these GHG emission targets, we consider two certificates trading scenarios.
Emission targets for 2020
For the policy scenarios the aggregate emission target for Annex I countries for 2020 is taken from the proposal by the European Commission (2009), which assumes emission reductions of 30% below 1990 levels. Following Peterson et al. (2011) , this scenario may be interpreted as an illustrative example for possible Post-Kyoto climate targets, which are consistent with the 2°C target. While, in principle, there are many ways of splitting the 30% reduction target between Annex I countries, we chose the simplest type of burden-sharing rule: each Annex I country faces a uniform reduction rate of 30% below 1990 levels. 4 For non-Annex I countries the targets are derived from their NAMAs submitted under the Copenhagen Accord/Cancun Agreements, i.e. only non-Annex I countries which submitted a NAMA (NAMA-NAI) face emission targets in our policy analyses. Several NAMAs define the emission target as a target rate below baseline emissions and not as an absolute emission target derived from emission levels in a historic base year. As most NAMA submissions do not provide quantitative reduction targets, these submissions had to be translated into quantitative reduction targets. In case of China and India, which provided CO2e emission intensity targets, the targets are calculated using emissions and real (2005) GDP based on market exchange rates. For non-Annex I countries that submitted specific measures rather than general emission reduction targets, the associated emission reductions had to be calculated. To do so, we assumed that these reductions correspond to a threshold price of 10 €/t CO2e in 2020. In other words, NAMA-NAI countries are expected to implement the cheapest reduction measures available in the countries as NAMAs, where the cost of the most expensive measure implemented as a NAMA is 10 €/t CO2e. The emission reductions that can be realized at this price are between 5% below baseline in Jordan and 20% below baseline in several African countries. We employ the marginal abatement cost curves of the WEO reference baseline to derive these emission reductions. Table 1 shows the emission reduction targets as percentage of baseline emissions for the WEO reference baseline and the nuclear phase-out baseline (absolute targets are given in Table A2 in the Annex). At the global level, the policy scenario implies GHG emission reductions of 12% compared to baseline emissions in 2020 in both scenarios. Emissions for Annex I countries are, on average, 28% below emissions in the WEO scenario, and 30% below emissions in the nuclear phase-out scenario compared to the respective baselines. Since baseline emissions are 2% higher compared to the WEO reference scenario (see Figure 3 ), higher emissions reduction are needed in the nuclear-phase scenario to meet the target, more specifically, on average, required emission reductions increase by about 7% in Annex I countries in the nuclear phase-out scenario. In comparison, for non-Annex I countries the policy targets translate into GHG emissions which are 3% below baseline emissions in both scenarios.
In both scenarios Australia, Canada, Japan and the USA face more ambitious emission targets than the group of Annex I countries on average. Japan and the USA are most affected by the phase-out of nuclear energy. The differences in emission targets below baseline increase by 4 percentage points for Japan and 2 percentage points for the USA. This corresponds to an increase in total emission reductions of 13% for Japan and 5% for the USA. For Russia, the uniform 30% reduction target implies rather modest reductions compared to baseline emissions.
Because baseline emissions in Russia are higher in the nuclear phase-out scenario, required emission reductions increase from 7% to 9% below baseline compared to the WEO reference scenario. For the Ukraine the uniform reduction rate means, that GHG emissions may exceed baseline emissions by 36% and 37% in 2020.
As NAMAs for NAI countries are calculated below baseline emissions, percentage figures do not change for the two scenarios. Among the NAI countries listed in Table 1 , South Africa, South Korea, and Mexico face the most ambitious reduction targets relative to both baseline scenarios. For China and India, the efficiency targets pledged under the Copenhagen Accord / Cancun Agreement translate into emission reduction targets for 2020 that correspond to the baseline emissions. 5 In both trading scenarios non-Annex I countries may sell offsetting credits (CERs) to any Annex I country, but trading of CERs is assumed to be governed by three restrictions. First, to avoid double counting, NAMA-NAI countries can only generate and sell CERs for emission reductions that go beyond their domestic NAMA targets. Second, the non-Annex I countries can realize only 20% of their mitigation potential via CERs. This share is consistent with Castro (2010) who finds that only a small amount of a country's mitigation potential is realized under the CDM (see also Duscha and Schleich 2013) . Third, the Annex I countries face a limit in the use of CERs to fulfil their reduction targets as has been debated among Annex I countries during the discussions of the Copenhagen Accord. This CER-quota is set to 20% of the emission reductions below baseline and applies to all Annex I countries in both trading scenarios.
The Annex I countries allowed to trade in either scenario need to fulfil at least 50% of the required emission reductions below baseline domestically (domestic compliance quota). Since the domestic compliance quota may prevent perfect arbitrage, the costs of domestic mitigation efforts in countries where the domestic compliance quota is binding, will exceed the market price of AAUs. While the CER-quota and the domestic compliance quota reflect features of actual climate policy discussions, they prevent the globally cost-efficient outcome to be achieved via the trading mechanism.
5 Model results
For all countries and regions included in the model, sets of marginal abatement cost curves are generated from the WEO and nuclear phase-out baseline scenarios by progressively introducing a range of carbon-prices, following a similar approach as Anger (2008), Den Elzen et al. (2011) or Duscha and Schleich (2013) . Higher CO2e prices not only increase the deployment of nuclear power to reduce the CO2e emissions in the WEO scenario, but also spur other mitigation options such as energy efficiency improvements, fuel switch from coal to gas, or the deployment of renewables.
Based on the two sets of marginal abatement cost curves, the impact of the nuclear phase-out on certificate prices, domestic mitigation effort, certificate trading, power generation, and compliance costs may be evaluated for the all trade and the KP2 trade climate policy scenarios. Table 2 displays the prices of AAUs and the prices of CERs in 2020 in the WEO scenario and the nuclear phase-out scenario. Since trading between Annex I countries is not limited, they face equal marginal abatement costs of 61 €/tCO2e in the WEO scenario, unless their domestic compliance quota is binding.
All trade scenario
Certificate prices
The nuclear phase-out results in an increase in the price of AAUs of about 24% compared to the reference WEO scenario. This increase reflects the (small) increase in required GHG emission reductions in the nuclear phase-out scenario compared to the WEO scenario (baseline effect; see also section 5.1.5) and the fact that nuclear power plants are no longer available as a mitigation option (mitigation cost effect; see also section 5.1.5). Similarly, the price of CERs at 30 €/tCO2e is about 19% higher in the nuclear phase-out scenario compared to the WEO scenario.
Since the CER-quota of 20% is binding in both cases in some Annex-I countries, the price of CERs is below the price of AAUs. The vast majority of CERs are generated in China and India, reflecting both rather lenient emission targets (equal to baseline emissions) and large potentials of low-cost mitigation options in these countries.
Emission reductions and pattern of compliance
For most countries the increase in prices for emission certificates between the reference and the nuclear phase-out scenarios is associated with changes in emission reductions and with changes in the pattern of compliance -i.e. whether countries meet their emission targets via domestic mitigation or via purchasing certificates from abroad (see Figure 4 ). Typically, the nuclear phase-out not only means that the emission targets become more ambitious (because of the baseline effect); it also leads to a change in the share of domestic mitigation efforts in total required compliance efforts (domestic compliance share) compared to the reference case, i.e. WEO reference baseline, and nuclear phase-out baseline, respectively. Figure   4 shows that the domestic compliance share ranges from a minimum of 50% in countries with particularly high mitigation costs like Australia, Canada or Japan (i.e. the use of certificates is limited by the domestic compliance quota of 50%) up to 71% in the EU.
For countries that employ nuclear power, the impact of the nuclear phase-out on the domestic compliance share is governed by two countervailing effects. First, the mitigation cost effect results in a lower domestic compliance share, ceteris paribus. Second, higher prices for AAUs render additional domestic mitigation options profitable, leading to a higher domestic compliance share, ceteris paribus. For countries that do not rely on nuclear power, only the second effect matters. As a consequence, for most countries the nuclear phase-out is associated with a higher domestic compliance share.
In Russia domestic emission reductions are slightly lower in the nuclear phase-out case than in the WEO case. Russia not only faces higher baseline emissions in the nuclear phase-out scenario but also loses nuclear as a mitigation option. Both effects lower Russia's supply of AAUs (despite higher certificate prices) by about 80 million AAUs.
For China and the Ukraine, which are net sellers of certificates, the trading volume is slightly higher in the nuclear phase-out scenario than in the WEO scenario. In contrast to Russia, countries such as India and the Ukraine, where the share of nuclear power in the reference baseline is rather low, benefit from the higher certificate prices without losing a significant share of their mitigation potential. For China, where emissions are substantially higher in the nuclear phase-out baseline (by 350 Mt CO2e), certificates sales increase by around 30 Mt CO2e.
Power sector
A phase-out of nuclear power substantially affects the fuel mix in the baseline, as described in Section 3. Meeting ambitious climate policy targets leads to additional adjustments in the power sector ( Figure 5 and Figure 6 ). In both policy scenarios, the generation of coal-fired power is lower than in the baseline scenarios (WEO reference baseline and nuclear phase-out baseline). While in the WEO scenario nuclear power generation increases notably, in the nuclear phaseout scenario natural gas and wind increase the most. In particular, the power generation from natural gas, solar and wind increases by 9%, 21%, and 34% in the nuclear phase-out scenario compared to the WEO scenario. These developments go together with a 4% reduction in both global and Annex I electricity demand in the WEO scenario and -because of the fairly stronger deployment of more expensive low-carbon technologies -with a 5% reduction in the nuclear phase-out scenario. A comparison across countries reveals that the pattern of adjustment in the power mix is quite similar in most countries and in line with the overall global pattern. Figure 6 (as well as Table  A1 in the Annex) show the extent to which the effects differ across countries/regions with a high share of nuclear power. For example, the USA which heavily relies on the expansion of nuclear power to meet their climate policy target show a much stronger increase in electricity generated by wind (+65%), biomass (+28%) and natural gas (+6%) in the nuclear phase-out sce- nario than in the WEO scenario. In the USA and China, the effects are of an order of magnitude larger than in other "high nuclear" countries 2 .
Figure 6
Changes in electricity generation in 2020 for high nuclear energy countries (policy scenarios versus WEO and nuclear phase-out baselines)
Consequently, all Annex I countries but the EU experience an increase in CO2e emissions in the power sector in the nuclear phase-out scenario compared to the WEO scenario. Hence, those Annex I countries need to realize additional mitigation efforts in other domestic sectors or purchase certificates abroad.
In all Annex I countries though, the power sector hosts a substantial share of domestic mitigation efforts in both policy scenarios, covering between 28% (Ukraine, nuclear phase-out) and 54% (US, WEO) of total emission reductions. As can be seen in Figure 7 , the share of the power sector in domestic mitigation efforts is lower in the nuclear phase-out case than in the WEO scenario in all countries but Canada. This difference is particularly large in Japan and Russia, where the power sector's share of domestic mitigation efforts decreases from 41% to 32% and from 33% to 28%, respectively. The main increases in other sectors' contributions can be found in industry (Japan: +5 percentage points) and residential & services (Japan and Russia: +2 percentage points).
Figure 7
Relative contribution of domestic sectors to emission reductions in 2020
Compliance costs
Compliance costs 3 are measured as the sum of mitigation costs for domestic efforts (domestic mitigation costs) plus the net costs of purchasing and selling certificates (trade costs). The compliance costs in 2020 for the policy scenario compared to both the WEO reference scenario and the nuclear phase-out scenario are shown in Figure 8 . The compliance costs of each country are disaggregated into domestic mitigation costs and trading costs. Accordingly, the phase-out of nuclear power increases compliance costs in the group of Annex I countries by 28% compared to the WEO scenario, but effects vary significantly across countries.
Figure 8
Compliance costs in 2020 (all trade scenario)
As expected, the USA and the EU, where the uniform 30% reduction target implies the largest required emission reductions below baseline of all Annex I countries, also carry the highest compliance costs in both policy scenarios. The USA also faces the largest increase in absolute compliance costs due to the nuclear phase-out (+21 billion €). In the EU compliance costs amount to 34 and 37 billion € in the two policy cases. In comparison, Japan faces the highest relative increase in compliance costs (+58%), followed by the USA (+28%) (see Figure 9 ). In contrast, the Ukraine and Russia, who are net sellers of AAUs, as well as India and China, who are net sellers of CERs, could benefit from the increase in certificate prices. At the same time, though, the nuclear phase-out also leads to higher domestic mitigation costs for these countries. Taking both effects into account, India and China are better off in the nuclear phase-out scenario. Russia also benefits from the phase-out of nuclear energy, even though it sells fewer certificates in the nuclear phase-out scenario compared to the WEO reference scenario, but at a higher return (absolute figures on compliance costs can be found in Table A3 in the Annex).
In general, the nuclear phase-out tends to increase a country's domestic mitigation costs combined with either an increase in trade costs if it is a net-buyer of certificates or with an increase in trade revenues if it is a net-seller. A deviation from this pattern can be found in the EU, where the increase in the price of AAUs leads to additional domestic mitigation efforts, and hence reduces the amount of AAUs purchased from abroad.
Figure 9
Change in compliance costs induced by nuclear phase-out (all trade scenario)
Figure 10
Compliance costs as share of GDP (all trade scenario) Figure 10 displays the compliance costs as a share of GDP for the group of Annex I countries and for Annex I countries with positive compliance costs. Compliance costs for the entire group of Annex I are around 0.4% of GDP. That is, in general, costs to meet the 30% reduction targets are low, but differences exist across countries. These differences generally depend on the strictness of the targets and the countries' mitigation potential and mitigation costs. Total compli-ance costs are by far highest in the USA, followed by the EU (see Figure 8 ). Compliance costs are quite modest if they are measured as a share of GDP, i.e. they are below 1% for the USA and 0.5% for the EU, and slightly higher, i.e. between 1 and 2% of GDP, for Australia and Canada (see Figure 10 ). Likewise, the nuclear phase-out increases the compliance costs as a share of GDP in Annex I countries by only 0.1 percentage points. For Australia and Canada this share increases by 0.3 and 0.4 percentage points, and less for the USA (0.15 percentage points), the EU (0.03 percentage points),) and Japan (0.14 percentage points). Thus, for Japan, where the nuclear phase-out leads to the largest increase in total compliance costs of any country (see Figure 8 ), this increase amounts to a relatively small overall economic burden only. Figure 8 illustrates that the effects of a nuclear phase-out differ across countries depending on the share of nuclear in the power mix and on the importance of nuclear compared to other domestic mitigation options. To gain additional insights into the factors underlying the differences in countries' compliance costs in response to a nuclear phase-out, we decompose compliance costs changes into two effects. The first effect reflects the difference in compliance costs of each country due to the global increase in baseline emissions in the nuclear phase-out case compared to WEO (baseline effect). The second effect captures the additional compliance costs from losing nuclear power as a mitigation option (mitigation cost effect).
Decomposition of changes in compliance costs in baseline effect and mitigation cost effect
To quantify the baseline effect we recalculate each country's compliance costs in an adapted baseline policy scenario, assuming the baseline emissions from the nuclear phase-out case, but employing the mitigation cost curves derived under the WEO reference scenario . That is, countries where the phase-out of nuclear energy leads to higher (lower) baseline emissions must reduce more (less) emissions in the adapted baseline policy scenario than in the WEO reference scenario. The baseline effect is then calculated as the differences in compliance costs between the adapted baseline policy scenario and the WEO scenario. Note that, since the phase-out of nuclear energy leads to higher global baseline emissions than in the WEO scenario, certificate prices are also higher in the adapted baseline policy scenario.
To quantify the mitigation cost effect, we recalculate each country's compliance costs in a adapted mitigation cost policy scenario, employing the mitigation cost curves from the nuclear phase-out scenario, but assuming the emissions from the WEO scenario. Now, countries where the phase-out of nuclear energy leads to higher (lower) baseline emissions must reduce less (more) emissions in the adapted mitigation cost policy scenario than in the nuclear phase-out scenario. The mitigation cost effect is then calculated as the differences in compliance costs between the adapted mitigation cost policy scenario and the WEO scenario.
Any difference in costs between the nuclear phase-out scenario and the WEO scenario, which cannot be explained by the sum of the baseline effect and the mitigation costs effect, is captured by a residual. The residual is divided proportionally between the baseline and the mitigation cost effect. Note that for all five countries, the residual is only around 10%. The results of this decomposition analysis are shown in Figure 11 . For all countries but the EU, at least half the increase in compliance costs is attributable to the baseline effect. For Japan, the high share of the baseline effect reflects the large increase in baseline emissions in the order of 7% due to the phase-out of nuclear energy. For Japan, the mitigation cost effect only explains around 40% of the compliance cost increase, i.e. the loss of nuclear power as a mitigation option in Japan only accounts for around 40% of the overall compliance cost increase. For the USA, the increase in baseline emissions explains about 55% of the overall compliance cost increase, while losing nuclear as a mitigation option accounts for 45% of the increase in compliance costs. Unlike in Japan and the USA, the nuclear phase-out does not directly affect the baseline emissions or mitigation options of Australia and Canada. Instead, the increase in compliance costs reflects an indirect effect, i.e. the rise in certificate prices in the nuclear phase-out scenario.
In contrast, in the EU the mitigation cost effect explains the lion's share of the increase in compliance costs. Two factors drive this result. First, the EU does not experience a remarkable increase in baseline emissions (see Figure 3 ). Second, due to relatively low additional domestic mitigation costs, the EU may alleviate the effects of higher certificate prices by increasing do- The limit in trading and the resulting changes of both AAU and CER prices lead to differences in total compliance costs for Annex I countries. In the KP2 trade scenario total compliance costs of Annex I countries to meet the mitigation targets are 28% higher in the WEO case and 29% higher in the nuclear phase-out case compared to the all trade scenario (see Figure 13 ). On the one hand, these figures reflect efficiency gains from certificate trading in the all trade scenario, as more countries are involved in trading and marginal abatement costs can more efficiently be equalized. On the other hand, they also illustrate that the nuclear phase-out increases global compliance costs when trading of certificates is restricted. Compliance costs as a share of GDP in the KP2 trade scenario are shown in the Figure below Both Figures show that the increase in compliance costs due to the nuclear phase-out is more pronounced in those countries that no longer participate in KP trading than in those countries that continue to trade. For countries where certificate trading is no longer feasible, compliance needs to be achieved mainly through domestic action, supplemented by a small share of CERs. In Japan, the nuclear phase-out leads to an increase in compliance costs by about 120% in the all trade scenario (see Section 5.1.4). This cost increase amounts to almost 200% if Japan can no longer purchase AAUs from other Annex-I countries (KP2 trade scenario; see Figure 13 ). The main important part of this increase is founded in an increase in domestic compliance costs (). Similarly, in Canada the phase-out of nuclear energy increases total compliance costs by about 50%, and domestic compliance costs by more than 500% if Canada is banned from purchasing AAUs (KP2 trade scenario). In comparison, in the USA, additional compliance costs due to the nuclear phase-out do not differ much between the trade all scenario and the KP2 trade scenario. Domestic compliance costs to pursue the nuclear phase-out in the USA are about 40% higher without trade (KP2 trade scenario), but about the same amount is saved on expenditures for certificates. Thus, unlike Japan or Canada, the USA may substitute the purchase of certificates by domestic reductions at rather modest additional costs.
In contrast, in Russia, the additional compliance costs induced by the nuclear phase-out turn from negative costs (Russia is a net-seller of certificates in the trade all scenario) to positive costs in the KP2 trade scenario because Russia cannot generate any revenue from selling AAUs.
In this case, Russia reduces its domestic emissions to just meet its own emission target. The nuclear phase-out doubles these domestic mitigation costs, however to a minor extent.In the all trade scenario, the additional compliance costs induced by the nuclear phase-out are lower since the AAUs are generated to receive revenues and the nuclear phase-out has no additional impact on the strategic decision to generate AAUs. For the other net-seller countries (China, India, Ukraine), less revenue can be generated from selling certificates as prices are lower in the KP2 trade scenario than in the all trade scenario.
At the same time, countries which face stringent emission targets but which may trade certificates (i.e. Australia, EU) benefit from lower certificate prices in the KP2 trade scenario. Because of these lower price, in the KP2 trade scenario the additional compliance costs due to a nuclear phase-out are almost 60% lower for the EU and about 50% lower for Australia than in the all trade scenario.
In sum, the difference in compliance costs between the nuclear phase-out and the WEO scenario, i.e. the additional costs of meeting the targets, for the group of Annex I countries are 35% higher in the KP2 trade scenario than in the trade all scenario.
6 Conclusions
In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, support for nuclear power has declined in many countries. In this paper we employ a global energy systems model to analyse the effects of a global phase-out of nuclear power on the costs of meeting climate policy targets in 2020. Annex I countries are assumed to face a uniform 30% reduction rate compared to their 1990 GHG emission levels. The targets for non-Annex I countries are based on their NAMAs submitted under the Copenhagen Accord / Cancun Agreement. Our country-specific analyses of compliance costs recognize that a nuclear phase-out may increase baseline emissions because nuclear has to be substituted by other fuels (baseline effect), and that nuclear power is no longer available as a mitigation option (mitigation cost effect). We also explore the role of certificate trading on the costs of meeting the climate targets when nuclear energy is not longer available as a mitigation option.
Simulations of the new baseline suggest that a global phase-out of nuclear power by 2050 leads to a drop of the share of nuclear energy from 12% to 8%. However, this reduction is almost entirely offset by a stronger deployment of fossil fuels and slight reduction in electricity demand. As a result, by 2020 global GHG emissions in the baseline increase by 2% under a nuclear phase-out and the emission reductions required to meet the exemplary climate policy targets increase by 3% globally, and by 7% for Annex I countries. For countries with a higher share of nuclear energy in the power mix, this increase may be larger (e.g. 13% for Japan). In comparison, emissions for the EU and most non-Annex I countries are hardly affected in the nuclear phase-out case in the respective time horizon.
The analysis of two policy scenarios towards climate policy, All Trade and KP2 Trade, respectively, gives the following picture:
When certificate trading is not restricted (apart from the assumed domestic compliance quota of 50%), the nuclear phase-out increases AAU prices by 24% and total compliance costs of Annex I countries by 28%. But these effects differ substantially across Annex I countries. Japan (+58%) and the USA (+28%) face the largest relative increase, while China, India and Russia benefit from the phase-out because the additional revenues from selling certificates outweigh the mitigation cost effect. The increase of compliance costs in the EU are +9%.
In comparison, the increase in compliance costs in relation to GDP is rather modest for the group of Annex I countries, and highest for Australia and Canada (0.3 and 0.4 percentage points). Thus, even for countries that face a relatively large increase in compliance costs, such as Japan, the nuclear phase-out implies a relatively small overall economic burden as compared to the reference case. To meet the 30% emission reduction targets for 2020, domestic efforts in Annex I countries involve the power sector, in particular. As expected, the share of coal-based power generation declines and the share of natural gas, nuclear power and renewables (in particular wind power) increases. In the reference scenario, the higher generation costs of electricity reduce demand by around 4% compared to the baseline. The nuclear phase-out increases the share of natural gas, wind and solar in the power mix of most countries, in particular in those countries which rely strongly on nuclear power (e.g. USA). Under a nuclear phase-out, generation costs increase stronger than in the reference scenario, and lowers the demand by 5% compared to the baseline.
Decomposing the overall changes in countries' compliance costs due to a nuclear phase-out into a baseline effect and a mitigation cost effect yields additional insights. We find that the share of the mitigation cost effect is about twice as high in the EU as in Australia, Canada, Japan, or the USA. While the nuclear phase-out hardly affects baseline emissions in the EU until 2020, the loss of nuclear power as a mitigation option weighs rather heavily compared to other regions.
When trading of AAUs is restricted to those Annex I countries which have committed to a second Kyoto period, Canada, Japan, and the USA can no longer rely on certificate trading for compliance and must intensify their domestic mitigation efforts. Annex I countries which are allowed to trade (e.g. Australia, EU) benefit from lower certificate prices when trading is restricted, while net sellers of certificates such as China or India are made worse off. Compared to the scenario without restrictions on certificate trading, compliance costs of Annex I countries are about 28% higher than in the WEO reference scenario, and 29% higher than in the nuclear phase-out scenario. These figures reflect the savings in overall compliance costs, which may be realized via emissions trading.
In sum, our results on the costs of climate policy corroborate the thrust of the existing literature which typically finds the costs of complying with the 2°C target to be rather small, when compared to current policy developments. Our results further support those studies in the literature, which conclude that a slow deployment or a phase-out of nuclear energy only leads to a modest increase in global compliance costs, in particular, if trading of certificates is allowed. Hence, in the short-term a nuclear phase-out does not drastically change the global picture with respect to mitigation costs. However, individual effects can be significant as e.g. in the case of Japan which has to be taken into consideration in the context of international climate change negotiations.
Our modeling assumptions and findings should be interpreted with caution, though. Arguably, the assumed global phase-out of nuclear may overstate actual long-term reactions to the Fukushima accident. Yet, our nuclear phase-out scenario serves as an interesting benchmark, as it reflects what may happen should concerns about the future of nuclear energy increase dramatically, and globally. Also, it should be kept in mind that by focussing on the year 2020, where actual policy targets are available for most countries, our analysis takes on a relatively shortterm perspective. For example, the licences of most nuclear units in the USA expire after 2030. In addition, ongoing international climate diplomacy attempts to create binding targets which go beyond 2020. These targets need to be more ambitious than those implemented for 2020 to meet the 2°C target with a high probability. Thus, a global phase-out of nuclear power is expected to bring about stronger economic and environmental implications in the longer run than analysed for 2020.
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Endnotes 1 The new government, which was elected in late 2012, has announced that it would re-evaluate the previous government's decision to abandon nuclear power.
2 Carbon capture and storage technologies are assumed not to be available before 2020. For a more detailed description and applications of the POLES model see, for example, Criqui (2001) or Russ and Criqui (2007) .
3 For France, hardly any existing nuclear capacity will actually be decommissioned before 2020 but nuclear capacity, which had already been under construction for several years (e.g. the EPR in Flamanville) will be put into operation (as was announced by the French government in the wake of the Fukushima accident). 
